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Tanya Serisier 
“How Can a Woman Who Has Been Raped Be Be-
lieved?” 
Andrea Dworkin, Sexual Violence and the Ethics of Belief1 
In June 2000, Andrea Dworkin, an American feminist activist and author, pub-
lished an account of being raped in a Paris hotel room a year earlier. The story 
was met with widespread disbelief, including from feminist readers. This article 
explores the reasons for this disbelief, asking how and why narratives of rape are 
granted – or denied – truth status by their readers. The article argues for under-
standing the conferral of belief as a narrative transaction involving the actions of 
both narrator and reader. It posits that Dworkin was widely seen as an unreli-
able narrator but argues that for ideologically charged narratives such as rape 
narratives judgements of reliability and belief inevitably draw upon the norma-
tive standpoint of the reader. I suggest that there are opposing criteria for estab-
lishing the truth of rape narratives; a ‘factual’ or legal model, which sees rape 
narratives as requiring scrutiny, and an ‘experiential’ model, located within cer-
tain strands of feminist politics, which emphasises the ethical importance of be-
lieving women’s narratives. The article finishes with a consideration of the place 
of belief within an ethics of reading and reception of rape narratives. 
1. Introduction 
In June 2000, an article by Andrea Dworkin, controversial radical feminist ac-
tivist and author, appeared in the British newspaper The Guardian (Dworkin 
2000b). The article, “They Took My Body From Me and They Used It” was re-
published shortly after in the current affairs magazine, New Statesman with the 
title “The Day I Was Drugged and Raped” (Dworkin 2000c). The articles told 
the story of Dworkin being “drug raped” in a Paris hotel room in May 1999 by 
the hotel bartender and a waiter, and of the trauma which followed the assault.2 
The narrative was met with widespread public statements of doubt and disbe-
lief, including by many feminist commentators. Dworkin claimed to be “sad-
dened” but unsurprised by the reactions. “If the Holocaust can be denied even 
today,” she is reported to have said, “how can a woman who has been raped 
be believed?” (Gibbons 2000, 10) 
Dworkin’s question is also mine. I repose the question, shifting it from a 
rhetorical statement of hopelessness to a topic for investigation that sees belief 
and disbelief as opposing potential outcomes of autobiographical narrative 
transactions. The varying statements of disbelief that emerged in response to 
Dworkin’s account allow for an investigation of the conditions under which 
belief is not granted to autobiographical narratives and the explanations that 
readers offer for this refusal of validation. I am interested therefore in ‘truth’ as 
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a status that is granted by audiences’ conferral of belief, rather than as an onto-
logical fact or “objective” measure of correspondence with extratextual reali-
ties. In keeping with Philippe Lejeune’s (1989, 19) notion of the “autobio-
graphical pact” I argue that truth judgements can be viewed as a particular type 
of narrative transaction involved in factual and autobiographical texts. It is a 
transaction in which the narrator seeks to compel belief while the audience 
does or does not confer it. These questions are explored further in the opening 
section of the article. 
Despite its status as one of the “master narratives” of Western thought, 
autobiographical self-fashioning has received little direct attention within narra-
tive theory (Smith 1987, 6; Shen / Xu 2007, 44). Following the work of Dan 
Shen and Dejin Xu (2007), however, I suggest that the concept of narrative 
(un)reliability, when applied to autobiography, is closely tied to criteria of belief 
through reader assessments of narrative plausibility, narrator credibility and the 
narrative’s consistency with the reader’s understanding of extratextual realities. 
In autobiography, therefore, judgements of reliability are closely tied to notions 
of truth and belief. Further, judgements of autobiographical narratives always 
involve evaluations of the persons who tell them (Trinch 2003, 18). The con-
cept of reliability is also useful for elaborating the link between evaluations of 
narratives and narrators. In the second section I make use of Shen and Xu’s 
(2007) work on the application of narrative (un)reliability to autobiographical 
texts to outline the ways in which Dworkin’s account was found to be unreli-
able. 
Judgements of texts, such as whether they are reliable or true, are always in-
fluenced by what Ansgar Nünning (2008, 95) describes as “normative pre-
sumptions”. This is particularly true for narratives of sexual violence which are 
highly contested and ideologically charged. The third section contextualises the 
preceding discussion of reliability through a consideration of the application 
and functioning of the truth criteria that are applied to women’s narratives of 
rape. The period from the 1970s onwards, I argue, has seen a conflict between 
legal standards of “truth-telling” and the feminist project to enable and dis-
seminate women’s narratives of rape. I suggest that feminists sought to alter 
the truth criteria applied to rape narratives and to change, and broaden, the 
conditions under which women’s accounts of sexual violence would be be-
lieved. Dworkin’s account, along with other rape narratives, can therefore be 
seen to sit between two different generic standards of “truth-telling”, a legal 
standard with an emphasis on factual truth and external verifiability, and a 
feminist one with an emphasis on subjective or experiential truth and markers 
of authenticity. Narrators and readers of these texts must, therefore, navigate 
between different and ideologically opposed criteria of believability, making 
evaluations of texts highly conditional on the “normative” presumptions that 
readers bring to them. 
Theories of autobiography have emphasised the vulnerability and risks 
faced by autobiographical narrators as they seek to construct an autobiographi-
cal self and have that self recognised. In narratives of trauma this vulnerability 
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is enhanced both by the difficulty of telling and the potential for the original 
trauma to be compounded if a narrative is disbelieved or rejected 
(Smith / Watson 2008, 364). This vulnerability is particularly enhanced for 
women who tell of experiences of rape given the multiple ways in which these 
narratives have historically been disbelieved, over-written and re-inscribed as 
other stories, from ‘fantasies’ to tales of consensual sex (Ehrlich 2001). The 
third section, therefore, focuses on the stakes and consequences of believing or 
not disbelieving accounts of sexual violence. I investigate debates amongst 
feminist readers of Dworkin’s narrative to argue that there is an ethics of read-
ing or reception in relation to rape narratives that encompasses questions of 
belief. I conclude by asking what such an ethics should entail, considering how 
women’s stories of rape come to be believed but also more normative ques-
tions of why and under what circumstances they should be. 
2. Doubting Dworkin: Truth, Belief and Autobiographical 
Narratives 
Dworkin’s (2000b, 2) published account of the Paris rape opens with her sit-
ting in the hotel bar drinking and reading. The action commences when her 
second drink “didn’t taste right” and “then I felt sickish or weakish or some-
thing”. She orders room service, recalling that the waiter “who had also made 
the drinks, had said: ‘It will be my great pleasure to serve you your dinner to-
night’”. Upon reaching her room Dworkin immediately “conked out”, return-
ing only briefly to consciousness when the waiter entered the room. 
I fell back on to the bed. I didn’t lock the door. I came to four or five hours 
later. I didn’t know where I was. The curtains hadn’t been drawn. Now it was 
dark; before it had been light, long before dusk. (Dworkin 2000b, 2) 
She woke with pain “deep inside” her vagina, vaginal bleeding, and bruising 
and gashes on her breast and legs. 
The event at the heart of the narrative, the assault, is, therefore, initially re-
ported through ellipsis. Following her account of her pain, however, Dworkin 
reconstructs what she believes “must have” happened, based on her assess-
ment of her physical injuries: 
I couldn’t remember, but I thought they had pulled me down toward the bot-
tom of the bed so that my vagina was near the bed’s edge and my legs were easy 
to manipulate. I thought that the deep, bleeding scratches, right leg, and the big 
bruise, left breast, were the span of a man on top of me. (Dworkin 2000b, 2) 
These events occupy the first five paragraphs of a seventeen paragraph ac-
count. The remainder is devoted to the impact of this event on Dworkin’s life 
in the year between the events and publication of the narrative. She describes 
feelings of depression, helplessness and hopelessness, as well as a lack of sym-
pathy from significant others, including her gynaecologist and her partner, 
John. The final paragraphs tell of the death of her father six months after the 
Paris assault and her own subsequent disintegration. Following her father’s 
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death she was hospitalised for “bronchitis, pneumonia, cellulitis […] and blood 
clots” after being found wandering in New York in a “high delirium” 
(Dworkin 2000b, 2). The article concludes with the sentence, “I’m ready to 
die”. 
Five years later she did die of a bone disease whose onset coincided with 
her father’s death and her own hospitalisation. In “Through the Pain Barrier,” 
written a month before she died, Dworkin states that, for her, the bone disease 
was the final consequence of the sexual assault that occurred in Paris. Her doc-
tors, however, disagree: 
Doctors tell me that there is no medical truth to my notion that the rape caused 
this sickness or what happened after it. I believe I am right: it was the rape. They 
don’t know because they have never looked. (Dworkin 2005, 28) 
The trauma of the rape was augmented by the scepticism and disbelief which 
greeted her account right from the beginning. Her gynaecologist responded to 
Dworkin’s phone call the day after the assault by saying it had convinced her 
she needed an unlisted number while John “abandoned her emotionally” and 
“looked for any other explanation than rape” to explain Dworkin’s subsequent 
ill-health. Six days after the publication of the Guardian article Dworkin’s book 
Scapegoat was published in the UK (Dworkin 2000a). On the same day The 
Guardian published an article by columnist Catherine Bennett (2000), “Doubts 
about Dworkin,” which directly questioned both the validity of the account of 
rape and Dworkin’s veracity, suggesting that the timing was highly convenient 
given the need for publicity for Scapegoat. What followed was, according to 
sympathetic columnist Julia Gracen, “an accusatory pile-on […] in the UK 
press and on the Web” (Gracen 2000). Even Gracen, however, stopped short 
of accepting the validity of Dworkin’s account. She suggested that while “there 
is no question that something happened to Dworkin last year” the narrative 
was more likely to have resulted from mental health problems than an actual 
sexual assault. 
The controversy, Dworkin later stated, caused her to withdraw from public 
life. Commenting on the number of feminists who publicly doubted her ac-
count, Dworkin said it “was unbearable being disbelieved by my so-called sis-
ters” (Bindel 2004). In 2002, she re-emerged with the publication of her mem-
oir, Heartbreak, which dealt with her earlier life and omitted the events of Paris 
entirely (Dworkin 2002). In other accounts, however, the Paris rape remained 
the defining event of her final years, leading ultimately to her illness and death. 
This conflict between Dworkin and her readers can be seen as a failure of 
the “autobiographical pact” which structures narrator and reader expectations 
of autobiography, and which centres on questions of truth and belief (Lejeune 
1989, 19). Readers expect narrators to tell the truth and narrators expect their 
account to be believed. Within this interaction narrators therefore make a 
truth-claim for their story. They do this through generically framing it as an 
autobiographic account but may also attempt to buttress that claim, asserting 
the validity of their narrative through providing factual or verifiable details, as 
Dworkin does in the opening of her account: 
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I was in Paris. I was 52. It was Thursday, 19 May, 1999. I was in a garden in a 
hotel. I was reading a book. French Literary Fascism. I was drinking kir royale. I 
had two. (Dworkin 2000c, R9) 
The detailed specificity gives the impression of truth and testifies to the accu-
racy of Dworkin’s memory (Shen / Xu 2007). The final statements regarding 
drinking give a sense of veracity at the same time that they attempt to foreclose 
the suggestion that intoxication has affected the accuracy of her recollections. 
For readers to understand an account as true they must accept its validity or 
factual truth and the narrator’s veracity, points implicitly addressed in 
Dworkin’s opening. They must also judge the text as corresponding to external 
reality, as internally consistent and consistent with other accounts given by the 
author and as presenting a plausible series of events and interpretations, which 
match readers’ understandings of the world (Smith / Watson 2008, 359). If 
these conditions are not met to the readers’ satisfaction they will reject the ac-
count, refusing to confer authority and belief on the narrator. Disbelieving a 
narrative such as Dworkin’s means deciding it didn’t happen, at least in the way 
in which it was presented, and rejecting the truth claim made by the author. 
The account may be judged to be unsupported or even contradicted by ex-
tratextual factors, for instance, the presence or absence of hotel records vali-
dating the fact that Dworkin stayed in Paris in May 1999. It may be judged to 
be internally inconsistent. Or it may be judged to be implausible, if a reader 
finds it unbelievable that no official report or complaint was made by Dworkin 
following these events. Such judgements are made on the basis of judgements 
both of the text and its narrator. 
Dworkin’s response to her readers’ disbelief was to insist on their agency 
and responsibility, holding them ethically lacking for denying her account. She 
did this in a number of ways. In the quotation that refers to the Holocaust she 
refers to herself as “a woman who has been raped” and disbelieved, referenc-
ing the silencing, erasure and re-writing of women’s accounts of sexual vio-
lence that has been well-documented by feminists (e.g. Higgins / Silver 1991; 
Ehrlich 2001; Serisier 2007). The reference to the Holocaust extends this proc-
ess of generalisation through an analogy to revisionist historians and their era-
sure and silencing of the voices and stories of Holocaust survivors (Lyotard 
1988). The analogy both confers the moral legitimacy of victimhood on 
Dworkin and formulates the act of disbelief as normatively suspect. Her ac-
count of the disbelief of others is one in which she has been doubly wronged, 
both through a direct act of violence and the denial of her account of that vio-
lence. It is this second harm that makes the betrayal of her “so-called sisters” 
“unbearable” for Dworkin, emphasising both that readers have agency around 
questions of belief and that their judgements are inflected by social norms and 
relations of power. 
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3. Dworkin’s Unreliable Narration: Narrative Theory and 
Autobiography 
The concept of narrative reliability was developed by Wayne Booth (1983) 
whose rhetorical approach defined unreliability as lying in a discrepancy be-
tween the norms and behaviour of a narrator and the norms of the text’s im-
plied author. In Yacobi’s (2008, 109f.) constructivist approach, however, unre-
liability is conceptualised as a “reading hypothesis” that is formed to “resolve 
textual problems” such as internal inconsistency. In order to bridge the con-
ceptual gap between text-oriented and reader-oriented models, Ansgar Nün-
ning (2008) has recently outlined a synthesis of existing approaches, combining 
insights from constructivist and cognitive models with rhetorical and ethical 
concepts of narrative unreliability. This synthetical approach is compatible with 
Phelan’s (2005, 51f.) typology, where a narrator may wrongly or inadequately 
report, interpret or evaluate elements of a narrative, resulting in six types of un-
reliability: underreporting, misreporting, underinterpretation, misinterpretation, 
underevaluation and misevaluation. 
While the question of reliability in autobiographical narratives is relatively 
undeveloped, Shen and Xu (2007) provide a useful model of how the concept 
– originally developed for the analysis of unreliability in narrative fiction – 
might be applied to non-fictional storytelling. They argue that the constructiv-
ist approach on the whole is more fruitful than the rhetorical one given that 
the distinction between the implied author and the narrator does not apply to 
autobiographical texts. As autobiographical narratives involve “direct telling 
from author to audience” the author and narrator are more usefully collapsed 
into a single figure of the author-narrator. Autobiographical texts, however, 
still possess problems, such as inconsistency which readers resolve using hy-
potheses which may include unreliability of the narrative and its narrator. 
Catherine Bennett (2000), author of the original and most detailed critique 
of Dworkin’s narrative, can be understood as judging the text to be unreliable 
in various ways. She notes that the rape is under-reported as Dworkin did not 
directly witness it. Further, she complains that where “most people would ex-
pect to find facts […] Dworkin supplies inconsistency, absence of evidence, 
lack of support” (Bennett 2000, 9). This under-reporting leads Bennett to find 
the entire account implausible ultimately judging the rape to be a complete 
misreport, suggesting Dworkin may have even invented it to provide publicity 
for her forthcoming book. If the facts were true, she argues, surely the absence 
of the waiter and bartender would have been noticed. If the curtains had in-
deed been open, someone might have seen something. She also accuses her of 
misevaluation, either due to her mendacity or excessive naivety. Dworkin de-
scribes the rape as “foolproof”, concluding that prosecution would be impos-
sible: “You can do this hundreds of times with virtually no chance of getting 
caught, let alone having anyone be able to make a legal case in any court of 
law” (Dworkin 2000b, 2). Bennett contests this evaluation, pointing out that 
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physical evidence such as DNA from the bartender’s sperm could have easily 
been collected and records of unexplained absences of the bartender and wai-
ter from their posts would have provided circumstantial support to Dworkin’s 
story and evidence in a court of law. 
Bennett’s arguments draw attention to the role of external verifiability or 
truth in judgements of autobiographical reliability, recalling the autobiographi-
cal pact. “What really happened” is the “ultimate yardstick” in assessing auto-
biographical accounts and it is this that makes judgements of reliability and be-
lievability largely synonymous (Shen / Xu 2007, 56). The ambiguity of the text, 
therefore, is less likely to result purely from intratextual discrepancies. They 
also involve intertextual or extratextual phenomena, in that they conflict with 
other narratives, external facts or the reader’s wider knowledge of the world. 
The absence of extratextual verifiability and judgements of implausibility based 
on Bennett’s understandings of the world are both central to her doubts about 
Dworkin’s account. 
The significance of extratextual knowledge in judgements of autobiographi-
cal reliability leads Shen and Xu (2007, 47) to divide readers into two catego-
ries: an “uncognizant reader” who “is not cognizant of the discrepancies be-
tween the textual story and the real personal experiences it is supposed to 
represent”, and a “cognizant reader” who compares the textual world created 
by the author-narrator with their knowledge of the extratextual world. While 
uncognizant readers have few resources with which to judge a narrative or nar-
rator unreliable, cognizant readers such as Bennett engage consistently in 
judgements of reliability on the basis of the narrative’s consistency with inter-
texts by the same author and extratextual reality (Shen / Xu 2007, 57). 
Cognizance is in part a function of the reader’s familiarity, culturally, geo-
graphically and historically, with the world of the author-narrator. As Cham-
bers (2002) argues, such familiarity leads readers to believe that they can imag-
ine themselves in the story, and know how they would act, and indeed, how an 
authentic protagonist of that story would act. Judgements of autobiographical 
reliability are thus also “comparative”, judging the behaviour of the narrator in 
relation to how comparable others, including the reader, would act in similar 
circumstances (Shen / Xu 2007, 59). This comparative logic is also a clear 
component of Bennett’s (2000, 9) scepticism. If Dworkin awoke with serious 
injuries surely she would have sought immediate medical attention rather than 
simply phoning a doctor in a different country. If she believed she had been 
raped and “poisoned”, surely she would have gone to the police. 
Bennett’s criticisms of the text also involve questions about the real or his-
torical Dworkin’s actions in the world beyond the narrative, another unique 
feature of autobiographical narratives, according to Shen and Xu (2007, 49). 
They argue that the collapse of the implied author and narrator roles gives the 
real author a more direct role in the narrative transaction.3 The actions of the 
narrator are not only compared to general reader beliefs regarding the outside 
world but also to their knowledge and understanding of the author (47). In 
autobiography, reader judgements of narratives, narrators and authors are inex-
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tricably linked, to the extent that perceptions of an author may lead readers to 
see any narrative produced by them as inherently untrustworthy. On the other 
hand, the causes of narrative unreliability are located in the “incompetence, un-
truthfulness, unawareness, [or] misjudgment” of the narrator and, by extension, 
the author (Yacobi 2001, 224). 
In the narrative, Dworkin describes her life outside it: “I know a lot about 
rape. I study it. I read about it. I think about it […] I engage with prosecutors 
and lawyers and legislators” (Dworkin 2000b, 2). Bennett (2000) found the nar-
rative’s account of the real Dworkin’s actions implausible in part because of 
her identity as an internationally renowned radical feminist who has made a ca-
reer studying and decrying male violence. Dworkin’s own explanations of her 
inaction were inconsistent. Describing her expertise in the original narrative 
she claimed that knowing “too much” about rape had caused her paralysis. In a 
2002 interview, however she explained her decision not to take legal action as a 
result of ignorance: 
You’re in a country where you don’t know the language or the way the legal sys-
tem works. I didn’t know anything about drug rape, which is the kind I endured. 
It’s extremely confusing. You really don’t know what’s happening. (English 
2002, E1) 
If this description of an isolated woman, confused and lacking knowledge, was 
deeply at odds with the understanding that cognizant readers such as Bennett 
had of Dworkin, the inconsistency reached its peak in what became the most 
controversial passage in Dworkin’s analysis. Discussing her feelings of self-
blame, Dworkin goes through a ‘checklist’: 
no short skirt; it was daylight; I didn’t drink a lot even though it was alcohol and 
I rarely drink, but so what? It could have been Wild Turkey or coffee. I didn’t 
drink with a man, I sat alone and read a book, I didn’t go somewhere I should-
n’t have been wherever that might be when you are 52, I didn’t flirt, I didn’t 
want it to happen. I wasn’t hungry for a good, hard fuck that would leave me 
pummelled with pain inside. (Dworkin 2000b, 2) 
Even for Gracen (2000), one of Dworkin’s most sympathetic readers, this 
‘checklist’ was “contrary to everything a rape expert should know”. The nor-
mative dissonance was so pronounced that readers who did not simply concur 
with Bennett that Dworkin was a liar, found themselves compelled to offer 
other explanations, such as Suzie Bright’s (2005) comment that the checklist 
was the point in the narrative at which “you know she has completely lost her 
mind”. For these readers, the only way to resolve the inconsistency between 
the narrator and their understanding of Dworkin was to hypothesise that her 
identity had been fundamentally altered through the effects of mental illness.  
As Shen and Xu (2007, 78) point out, authors of autobiographical narratives 
are often public figures, well-known beyond the text. In Dworkin’s case espe-
cially readers came to the text not only with high levels of existing knowledge 
about Dworkin but often with strong and entrenched normative judgements of 
her personality and actions. Andrea Dworkin was a highly polarising public fi-
gure, seen as a heroic feminist militant by some and as an “anti-sex” villain by 
others (Serisier 2013). Readers in the former category were likely to come to 
the narrative with strong predispositions towards belief and sympathy. The at-
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titude of the latter group was described by Suzie Bright (2005), a long-time po-
litical opponent of Dworkin’s: “Plenty of my peers would say that they are ut-
terly cold to any misfortune that might befall her.” Such readers’ views of 
Dworkin would render them unwilling to engage with any account produced 
by her, no matter how traumatic the content. 
4. Genre and Judgement: From the Law’s Lying Women to 
Feminism’s Embattled Truth-Tellers 
The extreme nature of reactions to Dworkin indicates the importance of nor-
mative or ideological contexts for the evaluation of autobiographical texts. This 
context is broadly framed by the set of shared norms or beliefs that Roland 
Barthes (1977, 70f.) referred to as doxa. These beliefs structure our understand-
ing of everyday happenings and our judgements of the reliability, both factual 
and normative, of autobiographical and other factual texts. Applied to rape, 
these beliefs include both common sense understandings of how and under 
what circumstances rape occurs and gendered beliefs about how women and 
men should and do behave. Hegemonic beliefs in this area are often referred to 
by feminists as “rape myths” because they often bear little direct relation to the 
realities of rape (Medea / Thompson 1974). For instance, there is a strong cul-
tural belief that rapes are generally committed by violent strangers, whereas in 
reality most sexual assaults occur between partners, acquaintances and family 
members (Estrich 1987). These myths create an “alternative reality” which 
fractures and distorts women’s experiences and narratives until they are virtu-
ally unrecognisable (Kaspiew 1995, 350). For instance, Susan Ehrlich (2001, 
66) has documented the ways in which women’s legal testimony of acquaint-
ance rape may be rewritten as consensual sex. One way in which this is 
achieved is through applying an “ideological framing” of non-consent as re-
quiring “utmost” physical resistance. This framing enables the categorisation of 
women’s verbal signals, such as asking an assailant to leave, as ineffectual or 
inadequate. 
Ehrlich’s example also demonstrates the significance of generic and institu-
tional contexts in evaluating narratives. The same narrative that is deemed in-
adequate as legal testimony may be believed when told in a different genre. 
While the autobiographical pact is an articulation of the process of granting be-
lief within autobiography as a genre, many autobiographical texts are also or 
primarily located in other genres with their own truth criteria, such as the genre 
of legal testimony. Even within this genre, different types of testimony will be 
treated differently. A victim of theft, for instance, does not have his or her reli-
ability undermined by a failure to demonstrate physical resistance when testify-
ing. Whether or not a text is judged to be truth, fiction or a lie depends on the 
generic classification of the narrative and the understandings of that categorisa-
tion that readers bring to it. For this reason, translation between genres is a dif-
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ficult and risky process as Shonna L. Trinch (2003) demonstrates in her discus-
sion of the ways in which the “translation” of Latina women’s narratives of 
domestic violence from conversational accounts to legal documents in the 
form of applications for “Protective Orders” requires a series of erasures, sub-
stitutions and re-inscriptions. This risk is particularly pertinent for narrators, 
such as Trinch’s subjects who could be classified as “uncognizant” of the rules 
and truth criteria of a genre with which they are engaged. “Cognizant” narra-
tors, on the other hand, could be defined as narrators who are aware of both 
the broad cultural doxa and the generic conventions that will be used to evalu-
ate their narratives. These narrators will be better equipped to construct suc-
cessful narratives and to move between different genres. 
Historically, the primary institutional setting for telling and evaluating rape 
narratives has been the courts and their primary genre has been that of legal 
testimony with its demands of external verifiability and forensic truth. This re-
mains a primary lens for reading rape narratives, as Bennett’s (2000, 9) demand 
that Dworkin’s narrative provide “evidence” and “facts” demonstrates. How-
ever, since the late 1960s, feminist traditions of “speaking out” have existed as 
a competing genre with a different set of truth-criteria. Rape narratives thus sit 
at the intersection of a number of different genres, and the truth-criteria that 
should be applied to them are contested. In this section I explore Dworkin’s 
story not only as autobiography but also as a rape narrative. The telling and re-
ception of such narratives must be analysed, I argue, within the wider generic 
and institutional conflicts that surround accounts of sexual assault, and that 
these conflicts frame the construction and evaluation of the text. I first provide 
an account of these conflicts before exploring their operation in this example. 
Within legal discourse, rape is considered to be among the most heinous of 
violent crimes. Women’s accounts of rape, however, have often been met with 
suspicion, summarised most famously in the warning by seventeenth century 
jurist Matthew Hale that rape is “an accusation easily to be made and hard to 
be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so inno-
cent” (Ferguson 1987, 89). Modified versions of this warning, which in effect, 
encourage jurors to take a sceptical stance towards women’s testimony, per-
sisted in many English-language jurisdictions until the 1980s (Larcombe 2002, 
96). Legal discourses have been structured by, and perpetuate, cultural under-
standings of women’s narratives of rape as inherently untrustworthy. This has 
led some feminist theorists to describe the process of testifying as a “second 
violation” where not only a woman’s story, but also her veracity and rationality, 
are questioned (Grix 1999, 90). 
Wendy Larcombe (2002, 99f.) argues that legal distrust of women’s narra-
tives exists because they threaten the law’s self-conception as an “objective” 
arbiter of the truth on the basis of externally verifiable facts. Such facts are ex-
tremely difficult to establish in rape trials because there usually are no eye-
witnesses and forensic evidence cannot determine if sexual activity was or was 
not consensual, the key point to be proven in the majority of rape trials. Fur-
ther, it is generally not the “facts” that are in dispute but rather the “narrative 
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glue”, the way that incidents and events are combined into a meaningful story, 
one which is titled “consensual sex” on the one hand and one titled “rape” on 
the other (Brooks 2008, 417). In the majority of trials the law must differenti-
ate between two such stories, deciding whose narrative “glue” is most believ-
able. As Ehrlich’s above example illustrates, in deciding who to believe, the law 
has few resources beyond existing gendered doxa which in practice work to 
construct acquaintance rape cases particularly as casual sex. 
When second wave feminists turned their attention to rape in the 1960s 
they began to challenge these common sense understandings of sex and vio-
lence, as can be seen in Susan Brownmiller’s (1976, 369) response to the Hale 
warning: “Since four out of five rapes go unreported, it is fair to say categori-
cally that women do not find rape ‘an accusation easily to be made’”. They also 
argued that, given the historical suspicion, denial and re-inscription that had 
greeted women’s narratives of rape, feminist readings should be based on an 
ethical presumption of belief (Smith / Watson, 364f.; Serisier 2007). Finally, 
they argued that the law, as it existed, was an inadequate site to determine the 
truth of rape. This critique resulted in legal reforms aimed at altering legal 
truth-criteria or at least limiting its pernicious effects. “Rape shield laws” which 
restrict the type of questions that lawyers were able to ask in cross-examination 
are a useful example (Ehrlich 1991, 23). This reform was an attempt to decen-
tre the question of women’s ‘credibility’ and restrict the ways in which it could 
be undermined through tropes such as recklessness or promiscuity. 
They also facilitated the production and dissemination of women’s narratives 
outside of legal forums through dedicated publications (e.g. Warshaw 1988) 
and events such as “Take Back the Night” marches (Serisier 2007). Dworkin’s 
decision to publish her narrative rather than testify in court could be placed in 
this tradition. This new feminist genre replaces restrictive legal truth criteria 
with the aim of valorising narratives of experiential truth. Rather than being 
subjected to doubt and suspicion, women’s autobiographical narratives are 
considered to be a privileged site for truth production. Veracity, sincerity and 
authenticity are privileged over validity, plausibility and verifiability, reversing 
legal hierarchies. These narratives are not intended to ‘prove’ a truth in a court 
of law but to allow the expression of an inner truth. A secondary function is to 
facilitate the narratives of other women who, without a reasonable expectation 
of being believed, would be deterred from telling their stories. The role of au-
diences in this model is not to arbitrate but to confer belief and legitimacy. 
As the feminist model of “experiential truth” has become increasingly influ-
ential, however, critics have drawn attention to its limitations. Joan W. Scott 
(1992) has influentially argued that the model is based on a mistaken idea that 
women’s autobiographical narratives enable direct and transparent insight into 
the “truth” of their experiences. However, as theorists of autobiography have 
long argued, the act of narrating creates rather than uncovers the truth of the 
self. Or, as Leigh Gilmore (1994, 25) puts it, the subject of experience “is pro-
duced not by experience but by autobiography”. In other words, experiential 
truth is not pre-discursive but shaped through existing genres and discourses 
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and their systems of evaluation and belief conferral. Experiential narratives are 
not, therefore, authentic if authenticity is taken to signify an absence of artifice 
or narrative construction. Rather, “authenticity” is a narrative effect produced 
through its own set of generic conventions which in their own way are as rule-
bound and prohibitive as the conventions of legal testimony or any other 
genre. 
As Dworkin’s example shows, failure to fulfil readers’ expectations may re-
sult in a narrative being read as unreliable or untrue. Telling a story that is rec-
ognised as authentic and sincere involves a number of compulsory elements. 
Some insight into these elements is provided by the arguments of prominent 
defenders of Dworkin such as Deborah Orr (2005) and Julia Gracen (2000). 
Orr (2005, 14) asserts the supremacy of sincerity over verifiability in her claim 
that the central “fact” of the case was that Dworkin “really believed this awful 
violation had been made against her, and understood that she was widely dis-
believed.” She went so far as to say that “[w]hether Dworkin’s construction of 
events is true or not, is pretty irrelevant”. Authenticity, in contrast, is primarily 
achieved through what Judith Butler (1997, 144) has described as “compulsory 
affect”. Butler argues that genres which demand the “truth” of experience have 
a tendency to judge that truth in a narrator’s willingness and ability to commu-
nicate suffering to the reader. Dworkin’s success in this regard leads Gracen 
(2000) to argue that Dworkin should be believed because she is clearly suffer-
ing. Not only does she assert that “pain is pain” but it is her narrative’s expres-
sion of pain that demonstrates that “something” has happened to her. 
Feminist criteria for belief do not depart completely from broader autobio-
graphical measures of reliability. Experiential truth similarly requires a high de-
gree of consistency within and between narratives and for readers to be able to 
imagine acting or responding in a similar way in the circumstances described. 
Dworkin’s level of intertextual consistency was very high, adding to readers’ 
conviction that she “really believed” her own account. The narrative of rape, 
its aftermath and the pain of disbelief was told and retold for the remainder of 
her life. However, the internal consistency and plausibility of the narrative were 
more frequently questioned. For instance, Bennett (2000, 9) writes of 
Dworkin’s decision not to report the rape that “the reluctance of a rape victim 
to be further violated by examination and questioning is understood”, referring 
to the way in which feminist criticisms of the legal system have come to shape 
common sense understandings of survivors’ actions. “However”, she contin-
ues, “if this is what prevented Dworkin from seeking help it does not seem 
consistent with her current decision to relive the ordeal, in vivid detail, for 
readers of the New Statesman”. For Bennett, as for Gracen, “pain is pain” and if 
trauma prevents a victim from speaking then this should be true across differ-
ent sites of speech. 
In the debates and doubts over Dworkin no single mode of truth was able 
to assert its hegemony or completely sideline competing truth criteria. Both 
experiential models of sincerity and factual models of validity were applied to 
Dworkin’s account with different participants making claims for the primacy of 
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both perspectives. While Orr (2005, 14) insisted that Dworkin’s sincerity con-
stituted the central “fact” of the case, Bennett (2000, 9) equally vehemently as-
serted that “a rape either occurred or it did not”. The legal and factual truths 
demanded by Bennett remain powerful judgement criteria for assessing these 
narratives, even when they are told in other settings than the court and other 
genres than legal testimony. But these criteria are haunted by their inadequa-
cies, as demonstrated by decades of feminist critique. In what Gracen (2000) 
describes as this “brave new world”, or post-feminist era, women’s narratives 
of rape sit in a zone of contestation, between and among different generic cri-
teria for truth and truth-telling. This means effectively that readers have op-
tions in terms of what truth-criteria they apply to the narrative in order to con-
fer or refuse belief. I now examine the role of readers more closely, asking 
what is at stake in believing or not believing rape narratives. 
5. The Ethics of Reading Rape Narratives: What is at Stake in 
Belief? 
Autobiographical narratives do not merely tell a story but also work to con-
struct a self, an ‘I’ who is a product of the story and its telling (Smith / Wat-
son, 357). But this ‘I’ can only be constructed with the recognition of others, a 
recognition that follows from acceptance of the autobiographical narrative and 
belief in its story. This makes such narratives inherently risky, no matter how 
effectively the narrator deploys narrative and rhetorical strategies to compel be-
lief. A successful autobiographical account that achieves recognition also con-
structs a particular kind of “I”, one who is judged to be rational and truthful, 
while an unsuccessful account may do the opposite (Trinch 2003, 22). If a nar-
rator is seen as having failed to fulfil the autobiographical pact made with the 
reader, they are considered to be either bad or mad; a liar or unable to distin-
guish truth from fiction (Smith / Watson 2008, 359). 
The consequences of a lack of belief may be highly damaging for the teller, 
particularly when the narrative is one of trauma and suffering (Smith / Watson 
2008, 364). Narrators of traumatic experiences require legitimation of their nar-
ratives as part of the project of narratively reconstituting their subjectivity fol-
lowing a desubjectifying event. Audiences are asked to take an ethical stance of 
“witnessing” rather than an evaluative one (Smith / Watson 2008, 365). But 
there is no guarantee that an audience will respond ethically or recognise the 
story as true. For some the risk of failure or lack of recognition will be too 
great, rendering their story “untellable” (Norrick 2005, 136). Others will find 
that readers refuse to legitimate their narratives because they are too difficult to 
hear, because they are unwilling to take on the responsibility of witnessing or 
simply due to suspicion of the teller (Smith / Watson 2008, 366). If assess-
ments of narrative reliability are always a “subjectively tinged value judgement 
projection governed by the normative presumptions and moral convictions of 
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the critic” (Nünning 2008, 95), then this is especially true for autobiographical 
narrative of trauma where dis/belief may arise from a reader’s broader political 
convictions rather than any inherent property of the narrative text. This is ex-
acerbated for rape narratives which are both highly ideologically marked and 
often lacking external markers of verifiability. In such a case, the reader may 
have little choice but to rely on their normative presumptions and moral con-
victions when evaluating the narrative. 
Rather than automatically inferring a lack of reliability or truthfulness when 
confronted with a “textual problem” readers may, as Tamar Yacobi (2008, 110) 
explains, opt for an alternate “integration mechanism”, such as explaining nar-
rative ellipses or absences as an understandable result of trauma or judging it 
more important that the narrator adequately conveys her affective response to 
events than that she provides a factually accurate narrative.4 While Shen and 
Xu (2007) outline the ways in which reader cognizance facilitates judgements 
of unreliability in rape narratives cognizance may therefore grant readers addi-
tional resources to justify belief in a narrative. 
Feminist responses to rape narrative can be seen as a variation on Lejeune’s 
autobiographical pact, devised in recognition of the ethical responsibilities of 
readers. In its ideal form the pact requires that a reader accepts a narrator’s au-
thority to tell her story without reference to factors such as external verifiabil-
ity, factual reliability or plausibility. In short, sincerity obligates the reader to re-
spond with belief and failure to do so may be a sign of ethical or normative 
inadequacy. For Julia Gracen (2000), for instance, the sceptical responses to 
Dworkin’s story signified a public sphere increasingly hostile to survivors of 
rape. She writes that in the immediate aftermath of second wave feminism 
women’s narratives were more likely to be heard and respected but “over time 
the default response to the charge [of rape] has changed. Instead of a tendency 
towards belief and sympathy, there is now considerably more caution and 
doubt.” Such a conclusion was buttressed by Bennett’s (2000, 9) common 
sense formulation that Dworkin’s “rape claim, like any other, seems to deserve 
scrutiny”. 
As both of these approaches illustrate readers’ orientations towards a single 
rape narrative are informed by broader ethical and normative judgements ap-
plied to the genre as a whole. Consequently, responses to an individual narra-
tive are seen to have effects on the conditions of tellability and reception for 
future narratives, a presumption that is central to the ethics of the feminist 
autobiographical pact. For Orr (2005, 14), Dworkin’s experience of disbelief 
connect her to women “the world over”. Further, rejections of Dworkin’s ac-
count were implicitly based on the misogynist fiction that “Dworkin was sim-
ply too old, fat and ugly to receive any sexual attention at all”. More perni-
ciously the cultural reproduction of such tropes may inhibit other women from 
coming forward. Gracen (2000) argued that responses to Dworkin’s story con-
tained an “ugly lesson”: 
It says that if you aren’t considered a reliable witness to begin with, or if you are 
already considered a social outrage, the proof that you offer to overcome that 
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tendency toward doubt had better be utterly unassailable in every respect, or the 
real gangbanging will begin. 
This construction makes clear that denial and disbelief can be acts of violence 
with egregious consequences, in this case not only for Dworkin but for survi-
vors of violence more broadly. 
Given Orr and Gracen’s insistence on the violence of disbelieving Dworkin 
the validation that they offered of her account was, however, strikingly limited. 
While both reiterated their belief that “something happened” neither was will-
ing to affirm the factual validity of the narrative. Orr (2005, 14) instead as-
serted that the factual truth was “irrelevant” given that Dworkin both clearly 
believed in her narrative and was suffering from trauma regardless of the cause. 
Gracen (2000) was more explicit regarding her doubts, suggesting that 
Dworkin’s narrative, with its implausibility and incoherent elements, implied 
that it was a manifestation of some kind of trauma-related condition such as 
post-traumatic stress disorder. To believe that someone believes their account 
does not preclude disbelieving their account and, in the end, neither Orr nor 
Gracen was prepared to exchange a clear expression of belief for Dworkin’s 
own sincerity. While both Gracen and Orr rejected the characterisation of 
Dworkin as a “lying woman” they did not grant her narrative authority. Indeed, 
their position seemed to be that although Dworkin was not bad she might in-
deed be mad, a judgement echoed by other ‘sympathetic’ readers such as Bright 
(2005). The consequences of such a stance are paradoxical, particularly for 
Dworkin. While Orr could assert the irrelevance of the factual status of the 
narrative, acceptance of her story’s validity clearly mattered to Dworkin. She 
writes that her partner John’s inability to accept her account of the sexual as-
sault destroyed their relationship (Dworkin 2000b, 2). To label a narrator as 
sincere but mad as opposed to a liar does not offer a greater legitimation of 
their narrative or the self that it constructs, and leaves the ethics question sur-
rounding belief unresolved. 
The paradoxical nature of Gracen and Orr’s position suggests that despite 
their ethical orientation they were unable to successfully apply alternate integra-
tion mechanisms for the elements of the text that they found unreliable. This 
was perhaps because accepting the authority of the account had certain wider 
normative consequences. If sceptical readers could be accused of implicitly 
drawing on misogynist tropes Dworkin (2000b, 2) makes explicit use of them 
in her narrative. The ‘checklist’ discussed above is run through to assert 
Dworkin’s lack of culpability but in doing so implies that had she been guilty 
of any of the actions on the checklist she would have been somehow culpable 
for the violence committed against her. Bennett (2000, 9) also questions the 
ethical integrity of Dworkin’s refusal to act in the aftermath of the assault. If 
her account is factually accurate, Bennett asks, then, “Is this bartender, with his 
accomplice, to be allowed to continue drugging and raping female guests?” 
This question could potentially be directed not only at Dworkin but at readers 
who believe or validate both the facts of the account and the interpretations 
and evaluations that Dworkin offers of them. While feminists have drawn at-
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tention to the ethical harms of disbelief this narrative demonstrates that belief 
may also contain its own ethical complications. 
Possible reading positions that emerge from this debate include defining 
Dworkin as: a factually accurate narrator whose story ethically compels belief 
and legitimation, a factually accurate narrator whose normative outlook and ac-
tions in the extratextual world are questionable, a sincere narrator who tells an 
experiential truth of trauma but whose factual recounting and normative 
judgements cannot be granted authority or a liar. There are of course also pos-
sibilities of hybrid or ambivalent responses that contain elements of some or all 
of these. While the first position would validate Dworkin completely it would 
arguably also validate a series of “rape myths” and a lack of concern for future 
victims. The second position would confer belief on Dworkin only to censure 
her, making the ethical purpose of belief largely redundant. The third and 
fourth position refuse to verify the account as true, thus refusing to confirm 
Dworkin’s story and her identity as a traumatised survivor of rape, replacing it 
either with the identity of a confused subject of trauma or a liar. It is under-
standable that given these options, readers such as Gracen and Orr who 
wished to take an ethical position in relation to Dworkin, chose what they may 
have considered the path of least harm, a sympathetic reading that asserted her 
sincerity and their compassion for their suffering but that withheld the confer-
ral of full narrative authority with its unpalatable normative consequences. 
6. Conclusion: How Can a Woman Who Has Been Raped Be 
Believed? 
Was Andrea Dworkin raped in a Paris hotel room by a waiter and a barman? 
She was unable to produce a narrative which compelled its readers to answer 
that question in the affirmative. The same story, told in a different way, and 
perhaps by a different author, might have produced a different answer. Such a 
conclusion may appear deeply unsatisfying and even dangerous given that the 
subject of the story is sexual violence. However, it is less dangerous than an 
answer that provides the comfort of false certainty, and it helps to explain the 
very real problems that our society has in responding to women’s narratives of 
sexual violence, both individually and collectively. Rather than continuing to 
seek to establish the ‘truth’ of rape narratives it may be time to devote more se-
rious attention to how belief is called forth in readers and to developing an eth-
ics of belief when responding to women’s accounts of sexual violence. 
I have argued here that belief or the evaluation of an autobiographical nar-
rative as ‘true’ is a transactional process, part of the functioning of the autobio-
graphical pact. Truth, to paraphrase Nünning’s (2008, 94) discussion of reliabil-
ity, can be usefully understood as a form of authority sought by the narrator 
and conferred by the reader. While a narrator seeks to compel belief in her 
reader and a reader is able to confer belief upon the narrator in practice the 
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transaction generally requires both elements – a narrator who is cognizant of 
the appropriate truth criteria and a reader who is willing and able to recognise 
the narrative as true. 
These transactions occur within wider social and generic sets of truth crite-
ria, a fact understood by cognizant readers and narrators. Sets of truth criteria 
are not, however, ideologically neutral but rely on hegemonic ideas of how the 
world is and how it should be. For women seeking to recount experiences of 
rape the gendered doxa that surround their stories have often invalidated them, 
re-inscribing them as, for instance, narratives of consensual sex. An orientation 
of suspicion towards rape narratives continues in contemporary society, seen in 
claims such as Bennett’s (2000) that all rape narratives should be subjected to 
scrutiny. This ideologically charged cultural framework around rape narratives 
must be accounted for in any narrative attempt to compel or establish belief. 
Narrators cannot entirely eliminate the risk that their narrative will not find 
a receptive audience. However, if they are cognizant of the types of truth crite-
ria that are likely to be applied to their narratives they can seek to maximise the 
chances that they will believed through adopting specific textual strategies de-
signed to compel belief. In a different autobiographical account, published two 
years before the events of May 1999, Dworkin (1997, 16) describes her ap-
proach as one which seeks to compel belief through the rhetorical and affec-
tive force of her writing: “My only chance to be believed is to find a way of 
writing bolder and stronger than woman hating itself – smarter, deeper, 
colder”. A risk with this approach is that it may place excessive faith in the 
ability of affect to overcome seeming factual inconsistencies or difficulties, re-
sulting in the situation where even sympathetic readers grant that a narrative 
possesses sincerity but not accuracy. A second danger is that a narrative ap-
proach which consistently opposes dominant cultural beliefs may alienate as 
many readers as it compels, resulting in the highly polarised responses to 
Dworkin’s work and her public identity. 
An example of a more prosaic, and successful, strategy to compel belief can 
be seen in Alice Sebold’s (1999) account of testifying as a rape victim. She de-
scribes her testimony as a deliberate manipulation of tropes of innocence and 
virginity to construct herself as a believable and authentic victim: “I repre-
sented an eighteen-year-old virgin coed. I was dressed in red, white and blue” 
(ibid., 172). While this approach may successfully compel belief it is not with-
out its own risks. The narrator may erase or invalidate her own experiential 
truth in order to harness the authority of legal discourse. She replaces her own 
story with one that echoes the dominant narratives of the law, inadvertently le-
gitimating the myths that the law has put at the centre of its truth of rape 
(Heinzelman 1990, 100). 
As I have emphasised throughout this article readers also engage in ethical 
or strategic relationships to narrative. Readers of traumatic narratives, particu-
larly, are called by narrators to engage in a complex ethical act that recognises 
the harm done to the narrator, acknowledges the risks and significance of the 
narrative, and legitimates the narrator as a rational and truthful subject. An eth-
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ics of reading these narratives requires an orientation towards belief, and such 
an orientation forms the basis of what I have described as the feminist auto-
biographical pact in relation to women’s narratives of violence. They must con-
front the cultural tendency to cast women’s narratives of sexual violence as in-
herently deserving of critical scrutiny. 
An orientation to belief, however, is insufficient on its own. Conferring au-
thority onto ideologically contested narratives requires critical engagement with 
doxa that operate to invalidate these narratives as inherently untruthful or irra-
tional. These two ethical imperatives do not always align. This was seen in the 
discussion of Dworkin’s narrative but can also be seen in relation to Sebold’s 
story. In the case of Dworkin’s narrative, Gracen and Orr clearly sought to un-
dertake an ethical reading of Dworkin’s narrative but refused to validate the 
factual accuracy of the account or its reproduction of harmful rape myths. As 
this example shows, an ethics of reading may not necessarily entail belief. The 
question of “how” a rape narrative can be believed needs to be accompanied 
by questions of under what circumstances and why such narratives “should” be 
believed. An ethical reception of rape narratives requires adopting a set of truth 
criteria that can be applied to individual cases without compromising the orien-
tation towards belief. As the reception of Dworkin’s narrative shows, develop-
ing such an ethics remains an ongoing project. 
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1
 I wish to acknowledge the valuable and insightful suggestions of the two anonymous review-
ers as well as the DIEGESIS editorial team who have greatly improved this article. 
2
 The articles were identical apart from the opening sentence. The Guardian version begins, ‘I 
was in Europe’ while the version in New Statesman is, ‘I was in Paris.’ 
3
 In what follows I will distinguish between the narrator (incorporating the implied author) and 
the author, meaning the real or historical Andrea Dworkin. 
4 Yacobi’s (2008, 110-113) discussion usefully outlines what she considers to be five major ty-
pes of integration mechanisms. However, the full typology is not necessary for my argument 
here which requires only recognition that readers have resources to facilitate belief in a text just 
as they have to facilitate disbelief. 
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